Adu Boahen didn’t engage in corruption – OSP full report

Following the conclusion of the investigation that lasted almost a year, the OSP has released its report detailing its findings of the Charles Adu Boahen case. The report includes the findings and recommendations by the OSP. Read the full report below.

Report of Investigation into Alleged Commission of Corruption and Corruption-Related Offences involving Charles Adu Boahe

1.0 Introduction
1.1 The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) presents this report on an investigation into suspected corruption and corruption-related offences involving Charles Adu Boahen, a former Minister of State at the Ministry of Finance. 

1.2 The report has been heavily redacted to safeguard national security and to protect the privacy of persons investigated and interviewed.

2.0 Charles Adu Boahen

2.1 Charles Adu Boahen is a Ghanaian politician and a member of the governing New Patriotic Party. He is the son of Professor Albert Adu Boahen (deceased), a historian and politician, who was the New Patriotic Party flagbearer in the 1992 presidential elections in Ghana. Charles Adu Boahen served as a Deputy Minister for Finance during the first term of President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo. Upon re-election for a second term, President Akufo-Addo appointed Mr. Adu Boahen as a Minister of State at the Ministry of Finance.

2.2 The President relieved Mr. Adu Boahen of his position as Minister of State at the Ministry of Finance in November 2022 on the back of allegations of the commission by Mr. Adu Boahen of suspected corruption and corruption-related offences. 

3.0 Referral Complaint 

3.1 By a referral dated 14 November 2022 President Nana Addo Dankwa AkufoAddo requested the OSP to investigate allegations of corruption and corruption-related offences involving Mr. Adu Boahen contained in an investigative documentary titled Galamsey Economy published by a celebrated Ghanaian investigative journalist, Anas Aremeyaw Anas and his associates operating under the corporate name of Tiger Eye P.I., a private investigation outfit headquartered in Accra.

3.2 By a complaint dated 13 November 2022 and received on 15 November 2022 Tiger Eye P.I. requested the OSP to investigate Mr. Adu Boahen for corruption and corruption-related offences arising from the investigative documentary referred to in paragraph 3.1. Tiger Eye P.I. attached an audio-visual recording 
contained on a flash drive together with a transcript of the audio-visual recording to the complaint.

3.3 The complaint alleged that, through its sting operations, Tiger Eye P.I. audio-visually recorded Mr. Adu Boahen in the act of his commission of corruption and corruption-related offences. The complaint stated that undercover agents of Tiger Eye P.I., posing as businessmen who were interested in investing in Ghana, met with Mr. Adu Boahen and tabled their investment plans and proposals to him. The complaint alleged that, sensing an opportunity to cash-in on his position as a Deputy Minister of Finance, Mr. Adu Boahen demanded twenty per cent (20%) of the value of the proposed initial investment or ten per cent (10%) upfront payment of the value of the proposed initial investment and post-investment sharing of the proceeds of the investment. 

3.4 The complaint also alleged that Mr. Adu Boahen offered to introduce the undercover agents to the President and the Vice President in aid of establishing them as very influential persons in Ghana. It was alleged that this offer was premised on Mr. Adu Boahen’s stated close ties to the President – akin to an uncle and a nephew relationship, and his political connections to the Vice President.

3.5 The complaint further alleged that Mr. Adu Boahen demanded Two Hundred Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to be given to the Vice President for the purposes of facilitating a meeting to be set up by Mr. Adu Boahen between the Vice President and the undercover agents. 

4.0 Investigation

4.1 The Special Prosecutor, upon determining that the referral and complaint spoke to the same set of allegations against Mr. Adu Boahen and that they were within the mandate of the OSP, authorised the commencement of preliminary investigation into the matter in accordance with regulation 5(1)(b) and subsequently, a full investigation under regulations 5(1)(c) and 6 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (Operations) Regulations, 2018 (L.I. 2374).

4.2 The investigation was conducted with as little intrusion into the privacy of persons as the circumstances permitted.

4.3 The contents of the flash drive attached to the complaint filed by Tiger Eye P.I. were forensically verified as a true reflection of the events represented thereon.

4.4 The investigation spanned a period of six (6) months. The identities of persons are disclosed where necessary.

5.0 The Context 

5.1 The allegations against Mr. Adu Boahen are situated in the context of an undercover investigative journalistic type of sting operations. Typically, a sting operation takes the form of the creation of a platform or opportunity for persons believed or suspected to be disposed to or involved in the commission of a crime to actually commit the crime, thus providing hard evidence for their successful prosecution and punishment. In the context of undercover investigative journalism, sting operations are usually characterised by the feigning of interest in a matter by undercover agents and the provision by them of opportunities for the commission of prohibited acts by the person of interest through winning the confidence of the person of interest for the person of interest to reveal his or her criminal activities or for the person of interest to commit a crime. The undercover agents usually secretly audio-visually records the acts of the person of interest as evidence of their criminal culpability.
 
5.2 Sting operations are controversial and divisive of opinion. This largely stems from the fact that the undercover agent never has a real intention of committing a crime and yet sets up the props and the platform for the commission of a crime by the person under investigation. In particular, the undercover investigative journalistic type evokes intense reaction from its critics. The triggers of the consternation of the opponents of this type of evidence collection are summed  up under three heads. First, the opposers of undercover investigative journalistic sting operations argue that unless sanctioned by the state, a private person has no business provoking and encouraging the commission of a crime by a person and proceeding to audio-visually record the person in the act of the commission of the crime without that person’s consent. In the estimation of the opposers, the audio-visual recording of a person without his consent violates that person’s right to privacy.

5.3 The opponents of undercover investigative journalistic sting operations also argue that it amounts to entrapment. On this score, the opposers posit that the person caught on camera committing criminal acts had no intention of committing a crime from the onset but went along with the seed sown by he undercover agent and the suggestion and encouragement of the undercover agent. And that but for the poisonous seed sown by the undercover agent and his active suggestion and encouragement, the person caught in the act and on tape would not have committed the crime.

5.4 Further, some opponents of undercover investigative journalistic sting operations label it as investigative terrorism. In their estimation, this type of evidence collection amounts to harassment of the person caught in the act on camera.

5.5 Herein lies the problem. Or, is it? For the answer, we invite a reflection on the actions of three persons of interest in the following illustration. 

5.6 Let us name our first person of interest Kofi Mensah. Let us say that Kofi Mensah has no criminal record. Let us assume that Kofi Mensah is not criminally minded and he has no intention of committing a crime. Let us place Kofi Mensah at a quiet and deserted underground parking lot of an apartment building in Accra. Now, Kofi Mensah is happily whistling to himself as he leisurely strolls through the parking lot to his car. He notices a vehicle with its doors ajar. He draws closer and sees no one in the vehicle. He bends to inspect the interior of the vehicle and he sees an iPhone lying on the driver seat. Upon further inspection, he concludes that the owner of the vehicle must have purposely left the doors ajar to airdry the interior and in the process forgot to take the iPhone and left it unattended. 

5.7 Kofi Mensah has several courses of action. He could simply decide to mind his own business and walk away while pondering over the carelessness of the owner of the iPhone. Afterall, the law does not require him to be a Good Samaritan. He could also, community-minded, assure by whatever means that the owner would not lose the iPhone to a criminally minded person who chances by. There is yet a third choice. Kofi Mensah could pocket the iPhone and walk off without the intention of returning it or having it returned to the owner. If Kofi Mensah takes the third course of action, he commits the crime of stealing – since by so doing he has dishonestly appropriated the iPhone without the consent of the owner. 

5.8 Let us leave Kofi Mensah in his thoughts for a moment and introduce our second person of interest. Let us name our second person of interest Kwaku Kumi. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi has no criminal record. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi is not criminally minded and he has no intention of committing a crime. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi is an undercover investigative journalist. Let us say that unbeknownst to Kofi Mensah, Kwaku Kumi is the owner of the iPhone and the exposed vehicle. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi is carrying out an undercover investigative journalistic sting operation upon a tip off that burglars regularly break into vehicles at that parking lot. To verify the claims or otherwise, he intentionally arranged the scene of the unattended iPhone and exposed vehicle and hid nearby to observe the actions of passersby vis-à-vis his prop.

5.9 Kwaku Kumi approaches the scene and he immediately senses Kofi Mensah’s moral conflict and dilemma. Kwaku Kumi suggests to a startled Kofi Mensah that they should sell the iPhone and split the proceeds. Kofi Mensah initially recoils from Kwaku Kumi’s suggestion. However, upon further prompting, he
agrees with Kwaku Kumi and he walks out of the parking lot with the iPhone upon proposing that Kwaku Kumi should meet up with him at an agreed rendezvous for the sharing of the proceeds. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi audio-visually recorded the entire encounter from the moment Kofi Mensah walked up to the opened-up vehicle till when he walked out of the parking lot with the iPhone. Let us say that upon a tipoff by Kwaku Kumi, Kofi Mensah is apprehended by the police as he attempts to sell the iPhone. Let us say that the relatives of Kofi Mensah are incensed that but for Kwaku Kumi’s suggestion and further prompting, Kofi Mensah would never have stolen the iPhone. And they further claim that Kwaku Kumi entrapped Kofi Mensah and actively harrased him to commit the crime and that Kwaku Kumi is not an investigative journalist after all but an investigative terrorist. They are particularly incensed that Kwaku Kumi audio-visually recorded the entire crime.

5.10 Let us now introduce our third person of interest, Kwame Samson. Let us say that Kwame Samson has no criminal record. Let us assume that Kwame Samson is not criminally minded and he has no intention of committing a crime. Let us place Kwame Samson at the same parking lot and by the same exposed vehicle and iPhone. Upon seeing the iPhone on the driver seat, Kwame Samson quickly grabs the iPhone and runs out of the parking lot before Kwaku Kumi, who was hiding nearby, could approach him. Let us say that Kwame Samson is apprehended by the police as he attempts to sell the iPhone. Let us say that the relatives of Kwame Samson are utterly shocked by his actions. They had always known him as a quiet and gentle young man.

5.11 If we are to collectively engage in objective detached reflection devoid of personal biases and interests, it would seem obvious to every reasonable person that Kofi Mensah is no special and certainly no different from Kwame Samson. They are both thieves – they stole the iPhone. They did not commit a crime of necessity driven by a justifiable or excusable desire to overcome a greater harm. The factors that motivated them to steal the iPhone may be different. However, they are both criminals of opportunity. True it is that they set off initially without previous deliberation or prior or advanced plans to steal the iPhone. Yet, upon being presented with the opportunity to steal the iPhone, they calculated that the benefit to them of stealing the iPhone would outweigh the risk of being harmed or apprehended in the process. Thus, they took advantage of the situation and stole the iPhone. They had several options. They did not have to steal, as no one compelled them to steal. They acted on their own free will. It makes no difference that in the case of Kofi Mensah he acted after the suggestion and further prompting by Kwaku Kumi. In the end, he willingly stole the iPhone. He was not under any form of force or duress exerted by Kwaku Kumi. The suggestion and further prompting to steal was not coercion. It was merely a test of moral resolve. It does seem to lie very ill in the mouths of the relatives of Kofi Mensah to assert that he would not have stolen the iPhone but for the suggestion and further prompting by Kwaku Kumi. Afterall, no one knows what is on a person’s mind. The devil himself does not know what it is on man’s mind – it is said.

5.12 Then again, it does seem to lie very foul in the mouths of the relatives of Kofi Mensah to claim that he was entrapped by Kwaku Kumi to steal the iPhone. Entrapment entails tricking an unwary person to commit a crime. The person so tricked is, by his lack of caution or prudence, unaware that he is engaged in a criminal enterprise, and he is led in that unwitting state to commit a crime. It does seem clear that Kwaku Kumi did not trick Kofi Mensah to steal the iPhone. He presented Kofi Mensah with the opportunity and suggested the benefit of the crime to him and offered him a cut of the proceeds. Kofi Mensah was not unaware that he was engaged in a criminal venture. Indeed, he knew at all times from the moment Kwaku Kumi approached him that he was being invited to a criminal adventure. 

5.13 In this illustration, Kofi Mensah’s actions show that he would seize the opportunity to commit a crime if presented with one – especially where, as in this case, the benefits far outweigh the risks. And it beggars belief that the opponents of undercover investigative journalistic sting operations blame not the perpetrator of the crime but rather placate them as victims of undercover agents. And upon that perplexing altar of appeasing the evildoer, they proceed to chastise undercover agents as though they were the scourge of the earth.

5.14 Persons like Kofi Mensah are not victims of circumstances caught in a web they are unable to extricate themselves from. They are not luckless victims who unknowingly walk into a criminal den. If they are victims, then they are victims of their own begetting and their inability to willingly walk away from crime. The responsibility for the crimes they commit should be laid fully on them and not on any suggester or encourager or provider of opportunity.

5.15 On another score, it does seem to do much violence to language for the relatives of Kofi Mensah to claim that Kwaku Kumi terrorised and harassed him to steal the iPhone. Kwaku Kumi did not coerce or by any means compel Kofi Mensah to steal the iPhone. It was not akin to the gunman situation writ large – steal the iPhone or I shoot you. Kwaku Kumi’s suggestion merely emboldened Kofi Mensah and steeled his resolve. If we will not commend persons like Kwaku Kumi, certainly we should not condemn them. They are underserving of our reproach. The persons deserving of condemnation and the stamp of opprobrium are persons like Kofi Mensah. On every level, it does seem clear that the only reason why the relatives of Kofi Mensah would complained is that the morally conflicted Kofi Mensah got caught stealing an iPhone – and on camera too.

5.16 The issue of invasion of privacy may forever feature in the discourse – since the perpetrator of the crime is audio-visually recorded without his consent in sting operations. However, the Supreme Court has decided that better it is to trump a person’s right to privacy to unearth or expose the commission of a crime, especially where it is near impossible to detect the crime except by covert audio-visual recording.

5.17 In any case, it seems abundantly clear that the insistence of the opponents of undercover investigative journalistic sting operations that the right to privacy of a criminal is invaded in a sting operation is akin to requiring undercover agents to disclose to persons being investigated that they are being investigated and to enquire from them whether they would consent to be audio-visually recorded in the process of the commission of the crime. Only an overenthusiastic legal system would insist on such bizarre requirements. In any case, which criminal worth his odious calling would agree or consent to be audio-visually recorded by undercover agents in the act of the criminal’s commission of a crime.

5.18 We have deliberately taken pages to illustrate, in some detail, the arguments of the opponents of sting operations and the tenability or otherwise of such arguments. At the OSP, we do not find the arguments against undercover investigative journalistic sting operations attractive. In our gathered experience in investigating, prosecuting, and preventing corruption and corruption-related crime, it seems to us that the views of the opposers of undercover investigative journalistic sting operations go around in circles without any real utility except to provide inexcusable grounds for the benefit of persons who have a propensity to commit crimes when offered the opportunity. And the summation of the arguments of the opponents of sting operations is merely that the criminal got caught on camera in the act of committing a crime.

5.19 The OSP welcomes and encourages sting operations, including the undercover investigative journalistic type. This is so especially because corruption and corruption-related activities are extremely difficult to detect and prove. The traditional methods of pen and paper investigations are attended by debilitating limitations in the fight against corruption and in gaining access to the operations of suspected corrupt persons as criminals become more sophisticated and develop obscure and intricate designs to avoid detection. Indeed, regulation 1(1)(d) of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (Operations) Regulations, 2018 (L.I. 2374) mandates the OSP to act on investigative journalism reports and sources. The OSP reckons undercover investigative journalistic sting operations output as investigative journalism reports and sources.

5.20 Globally, the trend is significantly shifting toward the acceptance of unconventional techniques of detecting and fighting crime, including the embracement of sting operations. In the context of combatting corruption, Article 50 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption encourages state parties to permit surveillance and undercover operations, and to allow for the admissibility in court of evidence derived therefrom within the limits of their domestic laws. To that admonishing must we pay fidelity.

6.0 Findings

6.1 Tiger Eye P.I. is a private investigation outfit incorporated in Ghana with a keen interest in the investigation of corruption cases of public interest. The agency received several reports and complaints and reports from members of the public about suspected corrupt practices at the Ministry of Finance, especially in respect of allegations upfront bribe-taking and the demand by some officials of the Ministry for unlawful payments of money from persons who had business with the Ministry. Tiger Eye P.I. commenced investigation in 2017 in respect of Charles Adu Boahen, who was then a Deputy Minister of Finance. The investigation was aimed at ascertaining whether Mr. Adu Boahen was engaged in the stated corruption and corruption-related activities.

6.2 Operatives of Tiger Eye P.I. conducted an undercover investigation over the course of twelve (12) months by disguising themselves as sheikhs, interpreters of the Arabic language for sheikhs and as officials of the Al Baraka Banking Group, a public investment business firm headquartered in Manama in the Kingdom of Bahrain. The investigation was quite elaborate and carefully planned and executed – covering several meetings in Ghana and in the United Arab Emirates and the purchase of round air tickets for two (2) persons (excluding Mr. Adu Boahen) on two (2) occasions between Accra and Dubai.

6.3 Circa March 2017, the investigative journalist who was shot to death in January 2019 in Accra, Ahmed Hussein Suale, an operative of Tiger Eye P.I., approached Solomon Amponsah, the desk officer in charge of Agricultural Development Bank projects at the Ministry of Finance. Mr. Suale introduced himself in disguise to Solomon Amponsah as Ahmed Divela, a representative of the Al Baraka Banking Group. Mr. Suale tabled a proposal that the Al Baraka Banking Group were interested in investing in Ghana, particularly in the banking sector. Mr. Suale sounded credible as he linked the intended investment to an impending banking and financial sector restructuring.

6.4 Convinced by Mr. Suale that the Al Baraka Banking Group genuinely intended to invest in Ghana upon the terms stated, Solomon Amponsah broached the intended investment to Mr. Adu Boahen. Whereupon Mr. Adu Boahen advised Solomon Amponsah to refer the supposed Ahmed Divela to Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu, a private legal practitioner operating from Accra for the purposes of due diligence and the ascertainment of the feasibility of the intended investment.

6.5 Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu satisfied himself as to the bona fides and existence of the Al Baraka Banking Group after several meetings in Accra and in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates with the supposed Ahmed Divela and Solomon Amponsah and other persons introduced as officials of the Al Baraka Banking Group. Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu naturally became convinced of the capability of the Al Baraka Banking Group to undertake the outlined intended investment. The only missing piece in the puzzle was convincing Mr. Adu Boahen to meet with the representatives of the Group, as Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu was made to 
believe.

6.6 Convincing Mr. Adu Boahen was not a straightforward matter. Initially, he was altogether unreceptive of the idea of meeting with the supposed representatives of the Al Baraka Banking Group. Subsequently, he softened his stance and he suggested a meeting in Accra. The undercover agents demurred. They insisted on a meeting in Dubai. Eventually, Mr. Adu Boahen agreed to meet with the supposed representatives of the Al Baraka Banking Group in Dubai by taking a brief detour to Dubai on his way to Singapore on official government business.

6.7 In February 2018, Mr. Adu Boahen, Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu, and Solomon Amponsah were met at the Dubai airport by the undercover agents and taken to a hotel. Two meetings took place at the hotel. The first meeting was attended by the undercover agents disguised and posing as officials of the Al Baraka Banking Group, Mr. Adu Boahen, Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu, and Solomon Amponsah. Upon expression of interest by the undercover agents of intended investment in the financial sector in Ghana through the establishment of an Islamic bank, Mr. Adu Boahen dutifully walked the supposed officials of the Al Baraka Banking Group through the processes of setting up a bank in Ghana.

6.8 There was nothing remarkable about this meeting and had it ended there this matter would not have come up for investigation by the OSP. However, the undercover agents had other designs. It turned out that that meeting was masterfully staged as a mere officious preparatory sideshow to set the tone for the second meeting.

6.9 Then came the second meeting, immediately after the first meeting. This was an exclusive one. Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu, and Solomon Amponsah were dropped from the list of attendees. Mr. Adu Boahen was ushered alone into a different room for further discussions with undercover agents disguised as a very wealthy sheikh and an interpreter of the Arabic language. This meeting was held in less formal circumstances, and it was characterised by deeper and frank discussions that formed the entire backdrop of the purpose of the sting operation. It was designed to enable Mr. Adu Boahen to talk freely in the absence of Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu, and Solomon Amponsah. It worked. This is because Mr. Adu Boahen became less inhibited in his speech. 

6.10 At the second meeting, the supposed wealthy sheikh expressed his desire of investing about half a billion United States dollars in Africa. He indicated that Ghana was one of the countries of interest and that he wanted to be connected to persons of the highest political influence for the purpose of establishing his business footprint. Mr. Adu Boahen, intending to assure the supposed sheikh of his political office, influence and connections, launched into his family history about his father, the relationship between the President and his father, his close ties to the President, which is akin to an uncle and nephew relationship, and his close affinity to the Vice President.

6.11 The supposed sheikh picked up on Mr. Adu Boahen’s assurances of the comfort of his high political influence and connections, and he laid the cards of the whole purpose of the sting operation on the table by enquiring as to the percentage cut Mr. Adu Boahen would take in respect of the intended investment in the financial sector in Ghana. After a bit of hesitation, Mr. Adu Boahen, on his own volition, suggested twenty percent (20%) of the intended investment as his cut. Mr. Adu Boahen must have meant this percentage cut demand as a shot in the dark. This is because he could not believe his immense good fortune and he could not hide his utter surprise as the supposed sheikh readily agreed to his suggestion. Indeed, Mr. Adu Boahen stated that he thought the sheikh would reject the suggested percentage cut as too pricey. 

6.12 Upon further enquiry by the supposed sheikh as to any further required commitments to secure the proposed high political influence in Ghana, Mr. Adu Boahen suggested the prudence of the payment of an appearance fee of Two Hundred Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to the Vice President– with the explanation that being a Muslim, the Vice President would be very keen to assist in the establishment of the proposed Islamic bank.

6.13 The supposed sheikh offered Mr. Adu Boahen Forty Thousand United States dollars (US$40,000.00) in cash as shopping money. The supposed sheikh placed the cash on a piece of furniture close to Mr. Adu Boahen, and he accepted and collected the cash with gratitude. During the investigation, Mr. Adu Boahen stated that he politely accepted the cash gift in order not to offend the sensibility of a potential wealthy investor looking to invest half a billion United States dollars in Ghana. 

6.14 The undercover agents secretly audio-visually recorded the entirety of both meetings.

6.15 In the high political office he occupied, it ought reasonably to have occurred to Mr. Adu Boahen that his bargain for twenty percent (20%) of the value of the proposed investment and his receipt of a cash gift of Forty Thousand United States dollars (US$40,000.00) from the supposed sheikh was outrightly improper. Mr. Adu Boahen exhibited lack of sound judgment. His claim that he accepted the cash gift to avoid offending the supposed sheikh lies very thinly; and his suggestion of the payment of an appearance fee of Two Hundred Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to the Vice President was quite reckless – especially as the Vice President was unaware of the business he was conducting and had not tasked him to demand money of whatever description on his behalf. All the indices point to the conclusion that Mr. Adu Boahen’s principal motivation was his own personal gain though he intimated to the supposed sheikh that he was driven by the potential developmental benefits to Ghana of the proposed investment.

6.16 The conduct of Mr. Adu Boahen amounts to trading in influence or influence peddling. This is the practice of using one’s influence or connections in public office or with persons in public office to obtain favours or preferential treatment for oneself or for another person, usually in return for payment. These acts have not been specifically prohibited in our jurisdiction as crimes per se. However, they are gravely frowned upon and punishable as crimes in some jurisdictions. This is because such acts are closely associated with corruption offences like using public office for profit and they also form the building blocks of general corruption. Then again, since they are closely associated with corruption, they have the effect of delegitimising democratic governance.

6.17 Mr. Adu Boahen engaged in trading in influence or influence peddling by employing his political office and close personal ties to the President and the Vice President to obtain favours of an actual cash gift and a prospective percentage cut of the proposed investment by the supposed sheikh. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the proposed investment was a prop and could not have actualised since there were in fact no actual investors. Mr. Adu Boahen stood to make a substantial personal gain had it been an actual investment proposal. It is no thanks to Mr. Adu Boahen that the investment proposal was never actually intended. Thus, he cannot seek refuge in its never-to-come-to-fruition attribute.

6.18 Mr. Adu Boahen certainly did not know that the whole enterprise was like a motion picture prop. He thought it was an actual investment proposal. Indeed, Mr. Adu Boahen admitted that he believed he was dealing with a genuine wealthy sheikh who had the advertised wherewithal to make good on the proposed investment. Therefore, his actions should be considered on account of his state of mind and state of knowledge at the time of the second meeting – which was that he thought he had bagged for himself a real prospect of a windfall of twenty percent (20%) of a coming investment worth Five Hundred Million United States dollars (US$500,000,000.00) in addition to receiving and pocketing Forty Thousand United States dollars (US$40,000.00).

7.0 Further Action

7.1 Though the conduct of Mr. Adu Boahen amounts to trading in influence or influence peddling, which is closely associated with corruption, there is no actual criminal prohibition of his acts in respect of which the OSP has a mandate to further act.

7.2 On that reckoning, the Special Prosecutor directs the closure, at this time, of the investigation in respect of allegations of corruption and corruption-related offences involving Charles Adu Boahen contained in the investigative documentary titled Galamsey Economy published by Tiger Eye P.I. The investigation may be re-opened should the circumstances and further facts so dictate.

7.3 The non-prohibition of most predicate acts of corruption and corruption-related offences engenders impunity of malevolent conduct and the erosion of democratic tenets, which spawn formidable hurdles in the fight against corruption, especially in the public sector. On this score, the OSP calls for the passage of a Corrupt Practices Act to comprehensively codify the prohibition of all forms of corruption. Further, the OSP joins up with the positively persistent calls of the pressure group, OccupyGhana for the passage of a Conduct of Public Officers Act to properly regulate the conduct of public officers. 

8.0 Commendation

8.1 The OSP commends the President for the referral to the OSP for the conduct of investigation into suspected corruption and corruption-related offences involving Mr. Adu Boahen.

8.2 The OSP commends Tiger Eye P.I. led by Anas Aremeyaw Anas for conducting the sting operation in respect of suspected corruption and corruption-related offences involving Mr. Adu Boahen, and for filing a complaint with the OSP in respect of the sting operation for the commencement of the present investigation.

8.3 The OSP commends the lawyers of the various persons who attended the OSP for their professionalism.

Kissi Agyebeng
The Special Prosecutor
The Republic of Ghana
30 October 2023